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When scholars problematize is/ought
inferences (IOI’s), they sometimes refer to
Hume’s or Moore’s fallacy (e.g., Schneider,
2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and
Evans, 2011). Although inferring “ought”
from “is” can be problematic, we argue
that, in the context of contemporary IOI’s
in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume
or Moore might be misguided. This is
because Hume’s and Moore’s arguments
concern the validity and soundness of
deductive inferences while in our view
contemporary IOI’s in the cognitive sci-
ences are better interpreted as defeasible
inferences.
In order to avoidmisinterpretations, we
first clarify key concepts in the debate in
section Key Concepts. In section Mind the
Gap, we revisit Hume’s and Moore’s argu-
ments against inferring “ought” from “is,”
and in section A Debate Shackled, we dis-
cuss contemporary IOI’s in the cognitive
sciences.
KEY CONCEPTS
Participants in the is/ought debate dis-
tinguish between descriptive statements
and deontic statements. Descriptive state-
ments describe or predict how the world is.
Deontic statements prescribe or proscribe
how we should act or reason.
While “is” statements are descriptive
statements, “ought” statements can be
descriptive as well as deontic. For instance,
“the streets ought to be wet because it is
raining” is a descriptive statement because
it predicts that the streets will be wet.
Conversely, “If you do not want to get
wet, you ought to carry an umbrella,” is
a deontic statement because it prescribes
what you should do. In this comment, we
only discuss “ought” statements as deon-
tic statements. Accordingly, we will not
discuss inferences from “is” to descriptive
“oughts” (cf. Oaksford and Chater, 2009,
2011), but only inferences from “is” to
deontic “oughts” (cf. Oaksford and Sellen,
2000; Stanovich and West, 2000).
We describe an is/ought inference
as an attempt to evaluate (i.e., fine-
tune, develop, arbitrate between) deontic
statements on the basis of descriptive state-
ments. The following is an example of
an IOI:
(1) Premise: More intelligent people are
more likely than less intelligent peo-
ple to make a guess, instead of rea-
son, when solving theWason Selection
Task.
Conclusion: We ought to make a
guess, instead of reason, when solving
the Wason Selection Task.
This inference can be interpreted as a
deductive argument. As such, the conclu-
sion is true if the inference is valid and
sound. A deductive inference is valid if
the premises logically entail the conclu-
sions, hence, if it is logically impossible
for the premises to be true and the con-
clusion false. In this inference, it is pos-
sible that the premise is true while the
conclusion is false. Thus, it is deductively
invalid.
Soundness takes the actual truth of the
premises (and conclusions) into account:
An inference is sound if it is valid and all of
its premises are true. The inference in this
example is not sound because it is invalid.
However, were it to be valid, it would still
be unsound because the premise is false.
More intelligent people are in fact more
likely than less intelligent people to reason
logically when solving theWason Selection
Task (Stanovich and West, 2000).
An inference can also be interpreted
as a defeasible argument. Defeasible infer-
ences have several features, two of which
are relevant for our argument (cf. Pollock,
1987, 1992). First, the inference can be cor-
rect even if it is not deductively valid. Let
us illustrate this features on the basis of
the following inference (which is not an
is/ought inference) (2):
(2) Premise: X looks red to me.
Conclusion: X is red.
Clearly, the premise does not logically
entail the conclusion. However, the infer-
ence is defeasibly correct because the
premise supports the conclusion—most
things that look red to me are, in fact, red.
A second feature of defeasible infer-
ences is that, when the inference is correct,
it can still be revised in the light of new
information. For instance, if we learn that
X is a daisy that is illuminated by red lights,
which can make things appear red when
they are not, we may suggest the following
revised inference (3):
(3) Premise 1: X looks red to me.
Premise 2: X is a daisy that is illumi-
nated by red lights, which can make
things appear red when they are not.
Conclusion: X is not red.
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While correct defeasible inferences can
be revised in the light of new information,
valid deductive inferences cannot: If the
conclusion follows deductively from a (set
of) premise(s), it will still follow deduc-
tively no matter how many premises we
add. (This is termed the monotonicity of
deductive logic.)
All this is relevant for is/ought debates.
In section Mind the Gap, we argue that
Hume’s and Moore’s arguments concern
the validity and soundness of deductive
inferences. In section A Debate Shackled,
we explain why IOI’s in the cogni-
tive sciences are better interpreted—and
evaluated—as defeasible inferences.
MIND THE GAP
Cognitive scientists often fine-tune,
develop or arbitrate between models of
how people ought to reason on the basis
of theories and data of how people do
reason (for a discussion and critique,
see Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Critics
(e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009;
Elqayam and Evans, 2011) claim that
some of these cognitive scientists com-
mit Hume’s or Moore’s fallacy. However,
in line with previous interpretations, we
contend that Hume’s and Moore’s fallacies
in the first place preclude deductive infer-
ences that are, respectively, not valid and
not sound (cf. Schurz, 1997; Pigden, 2010;
Quintelier et al., 2011).
It is useful to introduce a caveat here.
Hume and Moore formulated their argu-
ments in the context of ethical “oughts.”
However, in the cognitive sciences, their
arguments are applied to epistemic
“oughts.” This is acceptable for standard,
logical, interpretations of Hume’s fallacy,
which seem to hold at least for deontic
“oughts” in general (Pigden, 2010; P. 240).
In contrast, it is unclear if Moore’s fallacy
applies to the same extent to non-ethical
deontic “oughts.” For the sake of argument
though, we assume that both fallacies also
apply to epistemic “oughts.”
Let us now review Hume’s fallacy. The
standard interpretation of Hume’s fal-
lacy states that there are no deductively
valid inferences whose premises contain
no “oughts” and whose conclusions con-
tain (non-trivial) “oughts” (Schurz, 1997;
Pigden, 2010; p. 198–242). For example,
the following inference is not deductively
valid:
(3) Premise: It is the case that human
beings apply Bayesian reasoning.
Conclusion: It ought to be the case
that human beings apply Bayesian
reasoning.
This inference is not deductively valid
because it is possible that the conclu-
sions are false while the premises are true.
In Hume’s words, “ought, or ought not,
expresses some new relation or affirma-
tion,” which is different than the rela-
tion being expressed by “is,” or “is not”
(1739–1740, Book III, Part I, section Key
Concepts). When scholars infer “ought”
related conclusions from premises that
contain only “isses,” they commit Hume’s
fallacy.
However, Hume also argues that we can
add a premise—hereafter termed a bridge
principle - that connects “is” and “ought.”
We can for example suggest the following
bridge principle: “if more intelligent peo-
ple apply reasoning X, we ought to apply
reasoning X” (cf. Schneider, 2000, com-
menting on Stanovich and West, 2000).
This principle can then be used as a
premise:
(4) Premise 1: More intelligent people
apply Bayesian reasoning.
Premise 2: If more intelligent people
apply Bayesian reasoning, we ought to
apply Bayesian reasoning.
Conclusion: We ought to apply
Bayesian reasoning.
This inference is now deductively valid: if
the premises are true, then the conclusion
is also true. Hume’s fallacy does not pre-
clude the possibility of finding a plausible
bridge principle.
In contrast, Moore’s fallacy states that
deductive IOI’s with bridge principles
might be valid, but they are never sound.
The reason is that, according to Moore,
bridge principles can never be true.
Moore’s argument is that we should find
an analytically true bridge principle, one
that spells out what descriptive concepts
are in the meaning of the deontic con-
cept (Moore, 1988, §1–15). However, pace
Moore, this is impossible because deon-
tic concepts are already simple terms;
there is nothing in their meaning than
the deontic concept itself. Therefore, there
are no true bridge principles. Those who
define a deontic concept in descriptive
terms and then claim that this definition
is analytically true, commit Moore’s fal-
lacy (id.).
To summarize, we hold that Hume’s fal-
lacy states that deductive IOI’s are never
valid without a bridge principle, while
Moore’s thesis states that deductive IOI’s
are never sound because there is no true
bridge principle.
A DEBATE SHACKLED
Invoking Hume’s and Moore’s fallacy to
criticize IOI’s in the cognitive sciences can
be problematic: If, by making an is/ought
inference, authors rarely mean to deduce
deontic “oughts” from “isses,” then their
IOI’s should not be evaluated on the basis
of their deductive validity or soundness.
Indeed, we argue that it is more charita-
ble to interpret contemporary IOI’s in the
cognitive sciences as defeasible inferences:
Relevant authors (Oaksford and Sellen,
2000; Stanovich and West, 2000; Douven,
2011) point to descriptive reasons that
suggest, rather than logically entail, deon-
tic conclusions. Moreover, these authors
aim to make correct inferences that are
revisable in the light of new information.
Let us take a look at these features of con-
temporary IOI’s in the cognitive sciences.
Stanovich and West (2000) seem to
endorse the following inference:
(5) Premise: Studies show that more intel-
ligent people are more likely than less
intelligent people to reason logically in
task A.
Conclusion: We ought to reason logi-
cally in task A.
Oaksford and Sellen (2000) remark
that the following also holds:
(6) Premise: Studies show that high
schizotypal people are more likely
than low schizotypal people to reason
logically in task B.
Conclusion: We ought not to reason
logically in task B.
Clearly, these inferences are not deduc-
tively valid (cf. Schneider, 2000). However,
these authors never claimed that their
premise deductively entails a deontic con-
clusion. Instead, both Stanovich and West
(2000; p. 645) and Oaksford and Sellen
(2000; p. 691) speak of descriptive infor-
mation that suggests a certain deontic
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conclusion.Moreover, these arguments are
revisable in the light of new information:
What if, for instance, both schizotypy and
intelligence are positively correlated with
logical reasoning in the same task A? In
that case, we have to revise our conclusions
that we ought to reason logically in task A.
Thus, inferences 5 and 6 are better under-
stood as defeasible inferences and ought to
be evaluated accordingly.
Douven (2011) likewise suggests that,
in certain cases, descriptive information
can be used to inform us about deontic
statements. He reasons as follows:
(7) Premise: Human beings update on
conditionals by applying rule X.
Conclusion: Human beings ought to
update on conditionals by applying
rule X.
Again, as a deductive inference, this would
be invalid. However, Douven (2011) does
not seem to have a deductive inference
in mind. In his words, the premise again
“suggests” the conclusion, and descrip-
tive information leads to an “outline” of
norms or, based on the premise, we can
go “some way” in accepting the con-
clusion (253). This can be understood
as a first approximation that can be
revised. Moreover, there is no mentioning
that descriptive premises logically entail a
deontic conclusion.
These examples lead us to conclude
that IOI’s in the cognitive sciences are
better interpreted as defeasible inferences
than as deductive inferences. As a con-
sequence, their deductive validity and
soundness is not at stake. We therefore
suggest that, instead of referring to Hume
or Moore, critics of is/ought inferences
apply evaluation criteria for defeasible
inferences (see e.g., Nute, 1997). This
conclusion supplements previous work on
the is/ought problem. Schurz (in Pigden,
2010; p. 216), for instance, suggests that
defeasible conditional norms might pro-
vide plausible bridge principles in ethical
is/ought inferences. Other authors suggest
that defeasible reasoning can solve prob-
lems and paradoxes occurring in mono-
tonic deontic logic (e.g., Nute, 1997).
However, previous work usually focused
on ethical “oughts” rather than epistemic
“oughts.” We therefore hope that this
paper spurs research on defeasible reason-
ing with epistemic “oughts.”
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